To delegate or not to delegate: a review of control frameworks for autonomous cars by Richards, D & Stedmon, A
lable at ScienceDirect
Applied Ergonomics xxx (2015) 1e6Contents lists avaiApplied Ergonomics
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/apergoTo delegate or not to delegate: A review of control frameworks for
autonomous cars
Dale Richards*, Alex Stedmon
Centre for Mobility and Transport, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry CV1 5FB UKa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 11 February 2015
Received in revised form
1 October 2015
Accepted 19 October 2015
Available online xxx
Keywords:
Autonomy
Automation
Control
Human factors* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: dale.richards@coventry.ac.uk (
coventry.ac.uk (A. Stedmon).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apergo.2015.10.011
0003-6870/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd and The Ergonomics
Please cite this article in press as: Richards, D
Applied Ergonomics (2015), http://dx.doi.ora b s t r a c t
There have been signiﬁcant advances in technology and automated systems that will eventually see the
use of autonomous cars as commonplace on our roads. Various systems are already available that provide
the driver with different levels of decision support. This paper highlights the key human factors issues
associated with the interaction between the user and an autonomous system, including assistive decision
support and the delegation of authority to the automobile. The level of support offered to the driver can
range from traditional automated assistance, to system generated guidance that offers advice for the
driver to act upon, and even more direct action that is initiated by the system itself without driver
intervention. In many of these instances the role of the driver is slowly moving towards a supervisory
role within a complex system rather than one of direct control of the vehicle. Different paradigms of
interaction are considered and focus is placed on the partnership that takes place between the driver and
the vehicle. Drawing on the wealth of knowledge that exists within the aviation domain and research
literature that examines technology partnerships within the cockpit, this paper considers important
factors that will assist the automotive community to understand the underlying issues of the human and
their interaction within complex systems.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd and The Ergonomics Society. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
With increasingly congested road networks the existing road
infrastructure is unsufﬁcient at meeting the growing and future
demands that will be placed on it. Alongside this is a strong desire
to improve efﬁciency and safety. At the centre of accident causality,
human error remains a primary concern and advances in autono-
mous systems are hailed as the harbinger of a technology that can
potentially reduce road fatalities in the future.
In the scope of this paper, the term autonomous system will be
deﬁned as the quality of a technology that is able to perceive in-
formation from the environment and its ability to act upon it
without human intervention.
With the advent of autonomous systems, what better way to
reduce human error than by removing the human driver? The
impetus behind an initiative such as this is directly related to the
advances in technology that can assist in the management of the
trafﬁc infrastructure such as intelligent transport systems (ITS) orD. Richards), alex.stedmon@
Society. All rights reserved.
., Stedmon, A., To delegate or
g/10.1016/j.apergo.2015.10.01in-vehicle driver assistance systems such as advanced driver
assistance systems (ADAS).
Several states in the United States (i.e. Nevada, Florida, Michigan
and California) have reﬂected this growing appetite by passing
legislation that allows the introduction of autonomous vehicles
onto public highways. If we look across the current range of
autonomous cars (Google, Toyota, Nissan, BMW, to name but a few)
we can see they are all actively researching the integration of
autonomous decision-making technologies. Although there are
differences across these manufacturers in terms of their approach
to integrating autonomous systems, they all have one thing in
common: the driver who is ultimately responsible for the vehicle.
With the onset of smaller and cheaper sensors we have seen a
migration of such technology transfer from other domains into the
automotive community. For example, the development of Light
Radar (LiDAR) was initially designed for uses in analysing meteo-
rological conditions (speciﬁcally cloud density). Modern LiDAR
systems have been used in unmanned ground vehicles for detecting
obstacles whilst navigating. Perhaps the best-known use of this
within the automotive domain is the Google ‘Chauffeur’ car with its
recognisable spinning LiDAR sensor mounted on the roof. At the
moment this technology is expensive but there are alreadynot to delegate: A review of control frameworks for autonomous cars,
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this technology that could be integrated into other cars.
LiDAR is but one of the many different sensor technologies
available that could be integrated within an intelligent automotive
system. Within current ADAS functions, ultrasound technology is
predominantly used for parking and proximity/separation such as
adaptive cruise control (ACC), collision warning systems (CWS) and
driver awareness functions such as blindspot and intersection
warning. A number of possible applications that sensors may be
integrated into the vehicle are shown in Fig. 1.
With these technologies employed to assist the driver, if we
assume that ADAS functions such as intelligent collision warning/
avoidance are integrated into the wider trafﬁc network, howmight
these forms of automation actually support drivers?
There would appear to be two key ways in which the autono-
mous system could interact with the user. For example, an auton-
omous car will be able to respond to an event or situation that is
perceived by the system as a potential threat (using on-board
sensors) and either advise the driver on the appropriate action to
take and place authority on the driver to respond; or the car will be
authorised to take action on behalf of the driver in order to avoid an
accident. Both cases highlight the need for a framework of dele-
gating authority between the user and the system so that future
solutions are developed with a common user-centred perspective.
2. Automation and human performance
The implication of incorporating an element of autonomy
within a system predicates the delegation of authority, by the user,
to the system. That is, the user who traditionally is seen as being in
control of the system and ‘in-the-loop’ (Wiener and Curry, 1980)
accepts that the system is performing certain functions either
without their full knowledge (e.g. a ‘blackbox’ scenario) or whilst
they adopt a supervisory role. However, this can lead to ‘out-of-
loop’ situations where the operator is not fully-engaged in the task
andmay have diverted their attention to other activities but then be
faced with taking back control at short notice and without fully
understanding the current situation.
A certain degree of transparency must exist, which Norman
(1990) argues, is the operator's ability to understand the auto-
mated systems and ‘see through’ the system's processes. Thus, the
lower the transparency, the more removed the human is from the
information processing which might have serious implications for
situation awareness (SA).
There are many theories of automation that suggest that the
human should always have the ﬁnal say in any decision involving
safety (Billings, 1997; Woods, 1989; Stanton et al., 2015). Such aFig. 1. Some available automo
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the human always has authority over the decision-making ele-
ments within the system. However, delegation of control authority
has been outlined in theories of adaptive automation (Parasuraman
et al., 1992; Inagaki, 2003) whereby the system is authorised to
make certain decisions on behalf of the human. An existing
example of this is the demonstration of automotive collision
avoidance braking systems (Coelingh et al., 2010; Isermann et al.,
2010).
The application of automation can be viewed in most domains
as an attempt to reduce the workload burden of the operator whilst
also offering a higher level of safety and efﬁciency. This is partic-
ularly valid in the aerospace domain, where over the last thirty
years we have witnessed a revolution in automated ﬂightdecks
(Harris, 2011; Stanton et al., 2015). Of course, while there is a great
deal of literature citing the beneﬁts of increasing automation, there
is evidence that highlights potential drawbacks. What we can
conclude from the literature is that by increasing the level of
automation in an attempt to mitigate instances of human error, it
may not eliminate it altogether. In fact what we are confrontedwith
is a different type of human error borne out of the ironies of
automation (Bainbridge, 1983). Again, we can look at examples in
aerospace where incidents of automation bias (Mosier et al., 1998)
and automation surprise (Sarter et al., 1997) have been regarded as
a confounding factor in many accidents. As a consequence, it has
been argued that automation should take on tasks for the pilot
rather than instead of the pilot and support, rather than take over
from the pilot (Stedmon and Selcon, 1997).
For example, the tragic ﬂight of Air France 447 in 2009 is tes-
tament to how a highly skilled ﬂight crew can suddenly lose SA
when a system is under automatic control. While cases such as
these are rare, we are compelled to learn from them in order to
assure that the same mistakes are not made again.
It is important to compare those piloting aircraft (who are
generally highly trained and monitored, working in a sector that is
closely regulated, and with technologies maintained to a high
standard), operating aircraft worth millions of pounds and owned
by an aviation company (a party whomeasures the pilot's actions in
the interests of proﬁt and safety and who themselves will be under
international scrutiny) with those members of the public operating
their own vehicles with differing degrees of training, responsibility
and levels of maintenance for their own cars. For example, young
drivers in the fast moving, congested arterial roads during rush
hour, who are using vehicles close to the end of their lifecycles
operate in a different context to those piloting aircraft.
The importance of providing the user with a reasonable un-
derstanding of what the system is doing (and why) is essential,tive sensor applications.
not to delegate: A review of control frameworks for autonomous cars,
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Table 1
Levels of automation (Sheridan and Verplank, 1978; Parasuraman et al., 2000).
Level of
automation
Description
10 Fully autonomous: the automation system decides everything; acts autonomously, yet collaborating with other automation systems; ignores the
human
9 The automation system informs the human only if the system decides to
8 The automation system informs the human, only if asked
7 The automation system executes autonomously and then necessarily informs the human supervisor
6 The automation system allows the human supervisor a restricted time to veto before automatic execution
5 The automation system executes a suggestion if the human supervisor approves
4 The automation system suggests one decision action alternative
3 The automation system narrows the decision choice selection down to a few
2 The automation system offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives
1 The computer offers no assistance, the human must make all decisions and take all actions
D. Richards, A. Stedmon / Applied Ergonomics xxx (2015) 1e6 3especially in instances where a system failure or change in situation
demands occurs with little notice for the user to engage with
rectifying the situation. Much like humans, systems can fail and are
fallable (Reason, 2013). Therefore it is important that we do not
stand in awe of such advanced systems but rather try to optimise
the relationship in a safe and effective manner.3. Frameworks for delegating control authority
Autonomous cars are sometimes, rather misleadingly, referred
to as ‘driverless’ vehicles. It is not about taking control from the
driver, but allowing them to delegate authority to the system in a
manner that they understand and feel comfortable with. To facili-
tate the interaction between the user and the system a framework
is required that deﬁnes the delegation of authority under a variety
of different circumstances.
The traditional model for deﬁning the levels of automation was
put forward by Sheridan and Verplank (1978), and later revised by
Parasuraman et al. (2000). This framework (presented in Table 1)
provides ten levels of automation distributed between the user and
the system. These range from the system making all decisions on
behalf of the user (Level 10) to the human making all decisions
(Level 1).
It is possible to view this scale as a progressive range of dele-
gation of control from the user to the system. There are various
iterations of delegated authority between these two extremes and
it thus provides us with a useful understanding of the type of
interaction required.
Within the aerospace domain there is a variation of this,
whereby a pilot may delegate authority to the aircraft to perform
some preordained tasks. This is referred to as the Pilot Author-
isation and Control of Tasks (PACT) framework (presented in
Table 2). Bonner et al. (2000) outline the different levels of dele-
gated authority that can exist between a user (e.g. the pilot) and a
system that may be either highly automated or autonomous.
The PACT framework offers three basic modes of automation:
fully automatic, assisted, and human command. Balanced against
this are operational relationship, computer autonomy and pilot
authority factors that provide a rich understanding of how different
levels of autonomy can be assigned to different tasks (ranging from
routine processes to safety critical events).
Within the automotive sector there has been a similar push to
address the levels of autonomy for driverevehicle interaction. In
the United States, the National Highway Trafﬁc Safety Adminis-
tration (NHTSA), a Government Agency concerned with producing
and enforcing regulatory standards for the highways, has deﬁned
several levels of autonomous driving (presented in Table 3).
Using this classiﬁcation we can clearly see that the majority of
vehicle automation currently in development/operation (such asPlease cite this article in press as: Richards, D., Stedmon, A., To delegate or
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close to Level 3.
It is important to develop a better understanding of howa driver
interacts with an intelligent vehicle. This must allow for different
levels of autonomy to generate the ﬂexibility for a driver to delegate
different levels of control to the system at different times. However,
this is a complex problem (illustrated in Table 4) even if we try to
combine the elements of the previous models.
By comparing the elements from the different frameworks it is
possible to identify areas of common understanding (indicated by
the different zones of shading in each column) and also to highlight
where different interpretations of autonomy exist by those who
might refer to one framework or another (indicated by different
zones of shading across the rows). This representation of the
complexity of the models only goes so far in helping us understand
the scope of the problem. A key limitation is that it does not
encompass the dynamic nature of automated processes where
different levels of authority are required throughout a single
driving experience.
Theremay be instances that dictate the driver having full control
of the vehicle (simply to allow the individual to choose when they
want to drive) or opportunities for the vehicle to be controlled by
the autonomous system. This would either be seen as a beneﬁt in
the reduction of frustration or workload of the driver, or perhaps
the potential for the autonomous system to act as the supervisor of
the driver (e.g. a training and/or safety feature).4. Control delegation in autonomous vehicles
Building on the established knowledge we propose a model
(presented in Fig. 2) that highlights the relationship between the
user and the vehicle in terms of control and the delegation of
authority.
It is possible to categorise manual (Driver Authority), semi-
autonomous (Adaptive Assistance), and fully autonomous (Car
Authority) modes. The shift in terms of control is seen as the bal-
ance of interaction between the driver and the car and the dynamic
changes based onwhat level of control (direct/indirect) is delegated
from the user to the system. However, it is important to remember
that in all instances the driver will be responsible for the safe
operation of the car, regardless of the level of assistance that is
engaged.
It can be argued that with increasing levels of automation or
decision support available to the user, it is equally important to
provide the user with a better understanding of what the system is
doing (Bainbridge, 1983; Norman, 1990). The active monitoring of a
highly automated system is cognitively demanding (Tsang and
Johnson, 1989) and requires a high degree of vigilance on behalf
of the user (Molloy and Parasuraman, 1996). In order to reduce thenot to delegate: A review of control frameworks for autonomous cars,
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Table 2
The PACT framework (Bonner et al., 2000).
Level of automation Mode Operational relationship Computer autonomy Pilot authority
5 Automatic Automatic Full Interrupt
4 Assisted Direct support Advised action unless revoked Revoking action
3 Assisted In support Advice and, if authorised, action Acceptance of advice and authorising action
2 Assisted Advisory Advice Acceptance of advice
1 Assisted At call Advice only if required Full
0 Commanded Under command None Full
Table 3
NHTSA classiﬁcation of vehicle automation.
Level of automation Function Description
4 Full self-driving automation Vehicle able to perform all safety-critical driving functions and monitor external conditions
3 Limited self-driving automation The driver is able to cede all safety-critical functions to the vehicle in some instances
2 Combined function automation At least two primary control systems are automated in order to assist the driver
1 Function-speciﬁc automation One or more speciﬁc primary control systems utilise automation
0 No automation Driver in control
Table 4
Combined elements of vehicle automation.
Level of 
Automation 
PACT 
Framework 
NHTSA 
classification 
Description incorporating  
10 5 4 Fully autonomous; automatic; 
full self-driving automation
9 5 4 The automation system 
informs the human only if the 
system decides to; automatic; 
full self-driving automation
8 4 3 The automation system 
informs the human, only if 
asked; assisted; limited self-
driving automation
7 4 3 The automation system 
executes autonomously and 
then necessarily informs the 
human supervisor; assisted; 
limited self-driving automation
6 3 2 The automation system allows 
the human supervisor a 
restricted time to veto before 
automatic execution; assisted; 
combined function automation
5 2 2 The automation system 
executes a suggestion if the 
human supervisor approves; 
assisted; combined function 
automation
4 2 1 The automation system 
suggests one decision action 
alternative; assisted; function-
specific automation
3 2 1 The automation system 
narrows the decision choice 
selection down to a few; 
assisted; function-specific 
automation
2 1 1 The automation system offers 
a complete set of 
decision/action alternatives; 
assisted; function-specific 
automation
1 0 0 The computer offers no 
assistance, the human must 
make all decisions and take all 
actions; commanded; no 
automation
D. Richards, A. Stedmon / Applied Ergonomics xxx (2015) 1e64likelihood of human error it is important that the individual attains
a sufﬁcient level of SA pertaining to their situation and the context
in which the system they are interacting with operates (Endsley,
1995; Endsley and Jones, 2012). Mental workload has also beenPlease cite this article in press as: Richards, D., Stedmon, A., To delegate or
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safety (Tsang and Vidulich, 2006). The potential for a lack of vigi-
lance has been linked to a number of accidents (Warm et al., 2008).
Humans are poor at monitoring systems due to susceptibility ofnot to delegate: A review of control frameworks for autonomous cars,
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Fig. 2. Model of control delegation between the driver and the car.
D. Richards, A. Stedmon / Applied Ergonomics xxx (2015) 1e6 5cognitive processing to switch off and miss stimuli where percep-
tual thresholds are low (Kantowitz and Sorkin, 1987).
In these circumstances, especially if the autonomous system
operates in a way that is difﬁcult for the user to understand (i.e.
they are ‘out-of-the-loop’ or the system is not transparent but
rather ‘opaque’), their mental model of the system is compromised.
This is particularly important in terms of evaluating when a mode
error is made in automated systems (Lankenau, 2001) and also in
terms of subtle changes to the control delegation that the user may
not even be aware of.
Furthermore, in situations where the user is more of a super-
visor of the automated vehicle rather than an active driver of the
car, situations of mental underload can materialise. This is a
particularly problematic as it is very difﬁcult to identify when
someone is suffering from underload (Lavie, 2010). If mental
workload is reduced and SA is maintained then the issue of
monitoring the system suddenly becomes a critical aspect in using
the system (Saxby et al., 2013; Young and Stanton, 2002).
To compensate for mental underload, the introduction of an
interactive cognitive task can help to raise the effort required for
the user to engage with the task both in terms of physiological
measures of arousal and subjective assessment of alertness
(Gershon et al., 2011). By increasing cognitive effort, in terms of a
secondary task, it is possible to maintain a level of attention that
facilitates a degree of functional vigilance.
Traditionally adaptive decision support systems have been used
to provide assistance to users who need to make timely (and
sometimes) safety-critical decisions whilst under great task de-
mand or mental overload. For example, if we consider an adaptive
automation system on the ﬂightdeck the pilot might welcome a
decision support system that would monitor user physiological
indices for symptoms of mental overload. Similarly, an adaptive
system could also monitor for signs of mental underload and pro-
vide cognitive cues (akin to an interactive cognitive task) in order to
maintain levels of vigilance and alertness.
A further aspect of a reliance on automation is that the reliability
of such systems will degrade over time just as current mechanical
ones do. The design of the failure track is presumably part of the
process for the systems engineers and it is important to considerPlease cite this article in press as: Richards, D., Stedmon, A., To delegate or
Applied Ergonomics (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apergo.2015.10.01the autonomy lifecycles so that systems are future proofed and
potentially incorporate principles of graceful degradation so that
the entire system is not vulnerable to complete failure.5. Discussion
With the advent of autonomous vehicles we are seeing a shift in
the traditional role of the driver, but this does not diminish the
driver's responsibility; it merely changes how the driver interacts
with the system and how vehicles are controlled. The majority of
current use cases for autonomous cars place the user in the tradi-
tional setting of being in the driving seat in front of a steeringwheel
although the vehicle may well be operating without direct driver
input (in essence ‘hands free’). However, that is not to say that the
driver requires less opportunity to interact with the vehicle; in
some instances we could argue that the driver requires more in-
formation of what is happening so that theymaintain SA. As soon as
the driver delegates control authority to the vehicle then this is
more than a simple task shift, and a more complex interaction of
trust, reliability and safety. In autonomous mode the driver no
longer requires the traditional control interface with the vehicle.
The placement of hands on the steering wheel and feet situated
above pedals seems superﬂuous to the act of delegation. Indeed,
when the vehicle is within autonomous mode the steering wheel
and pedals act as means by which the driver may take control back
from the system much like the way in which ADAS currently
operates. However, there will still be a requirement for the driver to
be supplied with appropriate cues for effectively monitoring and
supervising the autonomous system. Some results have already
suggested that users arewilling to accept certain levels of delegated
authority when it comes to safety. For example, Itoh et al. (2013)
found drivers approved of a semi-autonomous collision avoidance
system that would present the driver with an auditory tone before
performing a safety manoeuvre.
Within the aviation domain the pilot and avionics systems
interact to form a working team and just as a conventional team of
humans operate, modern cockpits are characterised by trust in the
system, functionality of team members, communication within the
team, and where authority should be invested in the team (Taylornot to delegate: A review of control frameworks for autonomous cars,
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from the highly automated ﬂightdeck there have been many in-
stances of human error routedwithin failures of vigilance and a lack
of SA. There are a number of psychological phenomena that have
been cited as occurring in automated systems. These range from
mode confusion, automation bias to automation surprise.
Providing an increased level of support to the user by intro-
ducing automation and decision support has obvious beneﬁts in
terms of reducing cognitive load and reducing some elements of
human error. However, Kantowitz and Sorkin (1987) observed that
increasing levels of automation can leave the user human acting as
a simple supervisor of the automated process. Automation, in itself,
may also requiring speciﬁc training and place new/additional de-
mands on the user that direct task involvement may not.
The technology that will facilitate the introduction of the
autonomous car has entered a phase of demonstration, with the
Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) getting closer to market intro-
duction. What is less mature is the associated understanding of
how drivers will adopt to this new style of driving. We often view
these systems as being intelligent and in some cases out-
performing human abilities with little regard for the implicit na-
ture of the sharing of the primary task and objective that in essence
represents a shared goal between human and system (Baxter and
Richards, 2010). On the occasion that the human is happy to dele-
gate control to the system, thought is needed as to how to keep the
user ‘in-the-loop’ in terms of maintaining SA. Good SA is essential
not just formonitoring the system in terms of ensuring it is safe, but
more so for predicate events that suddenly occur when there is a
system failure or the system recommends or hands control back to
the user. In such instances human trust in the systemmay very well
lead to a dangerous degree of complacency (Bainbridge, 1983). As
illustrated in other domains this is all too common and can lead to
tragic consequences. This is why, for the foreseeable future, a driver
of an autonomous car will be legally required to be paying attention
to the road at all times (as is legally required in some of the US
States that have already passed legislation).
In order to facilitate discussion and research around these
points, the Model of Control Delegation provides a framework for
understanding aspects of the dynamic and complex interactions
that need to take place between the user and the system in order
for seamless and effective autonomous driving scenarios to be
developed on our roads.
6. Conclusion
The use of an autonomous car is not about taking control away
from the driver, but allowing the driver to delegate authority to the
system. This changes the nature of the driving role with the driver
adopting a more supervisory approach to monitoring an intelligent
system. In order for this interaction to be effective it is important to
design the system that allows the user to understand not only what
the system is currently doing (and plans to do) but also what the
system is not able to do. This builds a partnership of trust between
the user and the system that recognises not just human limitations
but combines these with systemic limitations in order to determine
a user-centred socio-technical system for autonomous driving.
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